Donnellan: “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. TWO USES OF . sentence “ Keith asserted that Smith’s murderer is insane.” To capture the. Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. Due Feb 13, by 10am; Points 5; Submitting a discussion post; Available after Feb 2, at 12am. Keith Donnellan, Joseph Almog, and Paolo Leonardi function is the referential use of definite description, in which the speaker uses it to refer to something.
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In this case, the proposition literally expressed is true, but what I intend to communicate is mistaken. It would be natural to understand this as a challenge to Frege. The theory of descriptions has encountered its fair share of criticism.
Very few natural languages have what we would recognize as definite and indefinite descriptions. One response to this line of argument is that it frontloads our assumptions about written works having single authors.
Nor, of course, could a referential use descriptuons associated with wide scope, as Kripke argued forcefully—they simply are not the same phenomenon. Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: In section IV, Donnellan extends these claims in two directions.
Since indefinites with the relevant scopal properties would violate standard syntactic constraints, indefinites must in some cases be semantically referential. We can say that this is a case where what we literally said was false, but that what we intended to communicate—the proposition meant—was true. The idea that both the existence claim and the uniqueness claim is presupposed can be attributed to AbbottHawthorne and Manley and Schoubyeamong others.
Keith Donnellan – Wikipedia
What is the DRT theorist to do? Volume 12Amherst: The two-level theory thus accounts for our conflicting intuitions. In section 7 we will eefinite to the question of whether the maximality claim should be part of the analysis or whether it represents a weakness in the analysis.
Michael Blome-Tillmann – – Philosophy Compass 8 2: But if the description is used referentially, then one refeerence still have managed to refer to something and to say of it that it is G. The different uses of descriptions then stem from the application of Gricean principles of conversational implicature to what was literally said.
What is also intriguing about this line of inquiry is that it suggests a new drscriptions for accounting for definiteness. Of course, as Kadmon stressed, pronouns typically do appear to introduce uniqueness, as an example like 25 shows.
Thought and ReferenceReferemce Both refer to or at least denote the planet Venus, but there are contexts in which it seems incorrect to say that they have the same meaning.
There is no unique sage plant in the minimal events. For example, perhaps descriptions can be fleshed out appropriately if we allow implicit spatiotemporal locating expressions to be inserted into the description.
Reference and Definite Descriptions
By applying Gricean principles in this context we have made out that Brown intends to say that there is a unique murderer of Smith and that he is insane. How can any of this be an argument for definite descriptions being semantically referential?
For instance, Donnellan criticized Bertrand Russell ‘s theory of definite descriptions for overlooking the distinction between referential and attributive use of definite descriptions.
Consider the following examples.
Walter de Gruyter, — Aristotle might have had none of the properties descriptiions we ordinarily associate with his name. According to Ludlow and Neale, it is implausible to think that all of these uses can be chalked up to semantic facts. Isidora Stojanovic – – Linguistics and Philosophy 30 6: Consider 30from Ludlow and Neale and 31 from Kripke. Elbourne forthcoming believes that the problem can even be constructed in cases that are extensional if we quantify into the description.
University Press Scholarship Online.