The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Relations
Seeing Strait. The Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Strategic Relationship. By Harry Krejsa. Print Download PDF. In January, Taiwanese voters took to the polls in one. August 11, The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Relations in New Co-Hosted by the Taiwan Benevolent Association of America and the Institute. Taiwan–United States relations refers to international relations between the Republic of China .. "America's Two-point Policy and the Future of Taiwan.
Eisenhower in Washington's "one China" policy, however, does not mean that the United States recognizes, nor agrees with Beijing's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan. Department of State informed the Senate that "[t]he United States takes no position on the question of Taiwan's sovereignty.
Department of State, in its U. Joint Communique switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.
The United States has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; 2. The United States has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the Chinese on arms sales to Taiwan; 3. The United States would not play any mediation role between Taiwan and Beijing; 4.
The United States has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and 6. The United States would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the Chinese. The United States would do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself. Sales of defensive military equipment are also consistent with the U.
Maintaining diplomatic relations with the PRC has been recognised to be in the long-term interest of the United States by seven consecutive administrations; however, maintaining strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan is also a major U.
The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Relations
In keeping with its China policy, the U. In addition, the U. China would likely greet a renewed or expanded Taiwanese submarine fleet with accusations of troublemaking and could respond forcefully.
Concrete, mines, missiles, and mountain-borne gunnery are cheap, asymmetrically effective, and already a part of the cross-strait military paradigm. Building out these capabilities further would not only be a more cost-effective and potent use of U. Focus on Warfighters More Than Weapons Instead, the United States should assist Taiwan in shifting military prestige away from weapons and toward warfighters. Many young Taiwanese do not see a career in the armed forces as a prestigious or desired path.
Taiwan–United States relations
The United States has a trove of experience managing the transition from conscription to a professionalized AVF and should lend its expertise to Taiwan so that it can maintain a credible deterrent to Chinese coercion. The United States should consider developing institutional capacity-building partnerships with the Taiwanese military and Ministry of National Defense focused on the transition to an AVF.
The Ministry of Defense Advisors program and the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative serve as models for embedding subject matter experts inside foreign defense organizations to collaborate on organizational improvements. Though historically focused on building ministerial capacity through fundamental process improvement in relatively weak states, these programs or a similar one could prove an ideal platform through which to provide AVF transition support.
Seeing Strait | Center for a New American Security
The considerable turmoil facing the U. Retired civil servants and service members who oversaw the transition would have many insights to offer their Taiwanese counterparts in service now. A professionalized volunteer force requires significant human capital investments that are likely underdeveloped or totally absent in a conscription-based service.
The United States could tailor institutional support, exchange, or training efforts to emphasize these new lines of effort that are likely foreign to a traditionally conscription-based force, including the quantitative analysis required to constantly test, evaluate, and adjust course as needed. Place these warfighter-focused initiatives on the same diplomatic level as conventional arms sales.
This will signal to Taipei — and Beijing — that Washington views these efforts at warfighter and institutional capacity building as just as important as periodic arms sales. Members of Congress have expressed interest in funding renewed defense training and exchange with Taiwan.U.S.-Taiwan relations under Trump and Tsai (and Xi): Panel discussion
A smarter, better-trained, and more committed force would be a more potent counter to Chinese threats and a source of pride for Taiwanese citizens, all without fundamentally disrupting the cross-strait strategic paradigm that exists now. National Statistics, Taiwan Provide an Economic Counterweight to China to Avoid an Economic Rejection of China The narrative of the Taiwanese economy — one of a high-tech manufacturing powerhouse punching far above its weight in the global marketplace — has long been a key part of Taiwanese identity.
Without a return to growth and a sense of affirmative identity, Taiwan could become focused on an identity built largely in contrast to China — a development that could bring with it a worrying rise in tensions. Luckily, if TPP is ratified and goes into effect as planned — though still not a certainty — it could provide Taiwan both the pathways for growth and a form of recognition and international visibility on the world stage.
Begin building the case for Taiwanese accession in regular talks.